02-03-2010
By Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Rudaw - Dr. Mohammed M. A. Ahmed is the President and founder of the Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies and spent 24 years working for the UN in different capacities. His new book America Unravels: Iraq Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs Compete for Supremacy sheds light on how the 2003 Iraq war engendered and shaped power struggles between Kurds, Shiites and Sunni Arabs.
Why did you write this book?
The purpose of the book was to shed light on the complexity of Iraq’s political, social, tribal and ethnic fabric, which had been hastily glued together by Britain following WW1, and the naiveté of the US war planners, who dragged Washington into a bitter war, tearing apart the old Iraq but failing to remake it.
Do you think the book is still objective enough about Iraq, despite you’re Kurdish?
The objectivity of the book can be attested by the number of references and documents used to back up the arguments presented in the book. The readers would be the ultimate judge of deciding the objectivity of the book, which is the product of six years of in-depth research.
You say the U.S. policy makers sought new military bases and control of Iraq’s massive oil reserves in Iraq, but almost no US companies are involved in the oil agreements in Iraq. Was the war really for oil?
It was not as much for the U.S. to gain effective control of Iraq’s oil reserves as it was to influence the flow of Iraq’s oil to the West. While the U.S. did not want to project itself as a colonial power, it created the needed opportunities for Western oil companies to enter Iraq’s oil sector. All the initial nine major oil companies, including the two American companies which won tenders, were from the West. As for bases, the U.S. military presence, dubbed as trainers, will continue in Iraq for sometime.
You wrote that the Sunni elite was replaced by the Shia, who are close to Iran. Recently there have been discussions about the role of Chalabi in Iraq, accusing him of working for Iran. While in the past he had good ties with the neocons. How do you see this?
The U.S. military and diplomatic corps might now regret introducing the semblance of democracy to Iraq and creating an opportunity for the Shiite majority to win power. Iraqi Shiites are no more under Iranian influence than Sunni Arabs are under regional Sunni Arab and U.S. influence. Instead of campaigning in Iraq, Sunni Arab politicians are now shuttling between the neighboring Sunni Arab capitals in order to win their support during and after the March election.
The battle between the U.S. and Sunni Arabs on the one hand and Iraqi Shiite leaders, including Chalabi, started in 2004 over the de-Ba’athification law, which allowed a blanket dismissal of former Ba’ath Party members from their government positions. Soon after issuing the law, the U.S. military and diplomatic corps realized that they had made a big blunder by dismantling the former government and creating a large pool of insurgents to fight them. Ahmed Chalabi who was the head of the de-Ba’athification Commission and, later became the head of the Justice and Reconciliation Commission, continued his crusade against Ba’athists in sensitive government positions and those who to infiltrate the parliament through the ballot box during the March 7, 2010 elections.
There is no proof that Chalabi and his allies are vetting former Ba’athists under Iranian influence. They are pursuing the Ba’athists for self-preservation. The misguided pressure from the U.S. and regional Sunni Arab states has pushed Iraqi Shiites closer to their natural strategic depth, Iran.
Why do you think Chalabi and the Shia decided to ban the ‘Baathist candidates’?
Chalabi is true to his Shiite community, whom he believed to have endured considerable injustice in the hands of the defunct Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath government, which was dominated by Sunni Arab nationalists. After more than 80 years of the Sunni Arab rule, Chalabi, Allami, al-Maliki, and many other Shiite leaders, felt that it was time for the Shiite majority to play a central role in Iraq’s politics. They abhorred the Ba’ath Party government of Saddam Hussein for committing horrendous crimes against their community, especially in Dujail, and during their 1991 uprising in the south.
Do you think a war is possible between the Kurds and Arabs, when the Americans leave?
I do not think so. As long the Shiites continue fighting Sunni Arabs, with Shiites fighting Shiites and Sunnis fighting Sunnis, the Kurds would be relatively safe. However, despite their political and ideological differences, Arab political parties remain united against Kurdish national ambitions. So far, the Kurds have done well by carefully navigating Iraqi and Middle Eastern political minefields
While in the past Maliki tried to play hardball with the Kurds and Sunni [s] and tried to present himself as non-sectarian, his party is now more Shia and less nationalistic. Why is this?
Al-Maliki disassociated himself from the United Iraqi Alliance, now called the Iraqi National Alliance, in order to project his party (State of Law) as a party for all Iraqis regardless of their sect and ethnicity. However, under present conditions, it would be difficult for al-Maliki to sell himself as a secularist politician. Despite the political rhetoric about Arab nationalism and secularism, voters are expected to vote for candidates belonging to their own communities and tribes. However, the Kurds are the common denominators between Sunni and Shiite Arabs.
Do you think Maliki will survive the challenge of the Iranian supported Shia alliance lead [led] by Hakim?
The real split between al-Maliki and al-Hakim could be detrimental to the Shiite community’s cause. For this reason, I expect that the State of Law and Iraqi National Alliance will closely cooperate to form a new government following the March 7, 2010 elections. After some 80 years, the Shiite political parties do not want to lose control of power, which they have enjoyed since 2006.
From the Kurdish point of view, which is the most likely coalition partner in Iraq?
The Kurds are more likely to establish an alliance with the Shiite political parties, following the elections, than with Sunni Arabs who project themselves as strong Arab nationalists and want to make drastic changes in the constitution, dominate key government positions, turn Saddam Hussein’s Arabization project of Kurdistan into a permanent reality, and erode KRG’s authority.
Do you think that the upcoming census and the increased number of seats of Kurds in Iraq, will deliver the Kurds the city of Kirkuk?
I do not see how the census under present conditions could deliver the Kurds the city of Kirkuk, while Arabs, Turkey, U.N. and the U.S. oppose the referendum and call for consensus. The issue has been defused by turning it into a dispute over the city of Kirkuk rather than the old province of Kirkuk, which was Arabized by Saddam Hussein’s government. In order for the census to be meaningful, it should have been done after redrawing the boundaries of the old Kirkuk province.
There has been a lot of accusations of corruption in the Kurdistan region. Especially regarding the oil minister and oil companies. Is corruption only part of Kurdistan, how is the corruption in Iraq, compared to the Kurdistan region?
Administrative and financial corruption is not limited to the Kurdistan region but is a common phenomenon throughout Iraq. The political leaders in Arbil as well as in Baghdad are well aware of the problem and claim that they are taking actions to eradicate it. However, we have yet read about cases of corruption and nepotism tried in the court of law.
Do you see the alliance of Allawi as a non-sectarian and secular list? Or is it a sunni list?
While Allawi, who carries considerable favor with Washington and London, is a secular Shiite politician, his list is a mixed bag of Shiite and Sunni Arab nationalists, including Ba’athists, who are hanging on to his coattails in order to reach the positions of power. Both Sunni and Shiite Arabs look at Allawi with deep suspicion and are likely to desert him following the elections.
How do you explain the split off of Gorran from the PUK. Is this a power struggle between factions within PUK or an outcome of lack of reforms?
The split in the PUK ranks is the outcome of both ideological differences and inadequate attention paid to Kurdish voters. While many Kurds are appreciative of the political accomplishments of the PUK and KDP, they are disillusioned with the lopsided distribution of wealth, widespread of nepotism and party control of public institutions, social services and government job opportunities. The Gorran movement is projecting itself as a party of the people and demanding changes in KRG practices while, supporting its policy towards Baghdad. The Gorran movement should exercise its newly acquired political power diligently to bring about positive changes.
Did Gorran make any changes in the Kurdish parliament and politics?
Except for rhetoric, there is no sign of any change taking place in the regional parliament. The Gorran movement must show the spirit of greater cooperation with PUK and KDP members of the regional parliament in order to be able to bring about changes. In order for Gorran to become a more popular movement, it has spread its influence in provinces other than Sulaimaniya. It is through togetherness the Kurds can rise, and through division they all fall.
You’ve worked for the UN for several years. How do you see the role of the UN in Iraq. Did they make a difference?
Despite the widespread corruption, the U.N. made a difference in the oil for food program in Iraq. However, the U.N. role in the political arena has been very limited, especially in reconciling the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, and had been less so of helping settle the disputes between Arbil and Baghdad. The U.N. has allowed itself to be used by the U.S. and Turkey to defuse the issue of Kirkuk and other disputed and Arabized Kurdish areas. De Mistora’s recommendations for settling the dispute over Arabized and disputed Kurdish areas, were shelved after returning from consultations with EU members in Brussels. The international community is using the U.N. in Iraq to perpetuate the issue of the Kurdish areas as they are doing in Palestinian territories, Cyprus and Bosnia Herzegovina.
© Rudaw
