- KurdishMedia.com
- By Mardin Ibrahim
- 12/03/2010
In order to analyse the rise of the Change Movement with a short time period, the roots of this political phenomenon should be put in the wider context of both the last 5 decades of political history in Kurdistan and also an understanding of current Kurdish political reality.
At the present time it would be hard to find a single reasonable mind which would reject the notion that the Change Movement is one of the main political actors in both Kurdish politics and also in Iraqi politics as a whole. So if not handled properly and wisely by the Kurdish authorities and ruling parties in the Kurdistan Regional Government major doubts would ensue as to the accountability that government; indeed the very legitimacy of that government would be under seriously question. Moreover, the relative security’ of Kurdistan would not remain as it is, but would probably slide into a very poor condition. One crucial point should be considered, namely the reason Kurdish ruling parties (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Democratic Party of Kurdistan, PUK and PDK hereafter) do not welcome the rise of opposition in Kurdistan is because their political culture build upon rejecting ‘the others’, and intolerance became an integral parts of their structure.
The Change Movement itself and also its opponents believe that the rise of opposition is directly related to the poor performance of the Kurdish government and the Kurdish representatives in the Iraqi Parliament, but I am more interested to look at this new phenomenon in a wider broad of sense. As I mentioned earlier the rise of that movement in a short period of time should be analysed under the light of current international politics and also the current politics in Iraq and Kurdistan.
It is very tough analogy to differentiate between internal and external factors when attempting to understand a political atmosphere, but I am still in favour of making that analogy as I shall explain.
External factors behind the rise of opposition
What do I mean by external factors?
I would like to inform the reader that I am very aware of and familiar with debates around the legality of war in Iraq; the arguments made in favour of war and also the counter argument against it, the question of morality and the legitimacy of the war and all discussions around the lengthy issues of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However I do not raise these issues not because they are not relevant but simply because they are beyond the scope of this article.
As outlined earlier regardless of the above discussions I do think the presence of the Americans in the region is a promising opportunity for Iraqis and Kurds alike to stand on their own feet and build an accountable government, create democracy and widen the role of institutions to facilitate the life of Iraqi citizens.
The presence of the Americans in Iraq is a crucial factor for stability in Kurdistan. None of us has forgotten the savage civil war waged between the PUK and the PDK (and indeed inter-fighting amongst these groups, the PKK and Islamist groups. The roots of civil war between the Kurdish factions are. The cause of the fighting is rooted in the political culture of non- tolerance is still exists between the PUK and PDK; regarding that point I assume nothing has changed. The only change is the American agenda in the region which has directly influenced the political process in Kurdistan ( ironically in a positive way, and I use the term ironically because it is a well known fact in political analysis that present of foreign troops is negatively interpreted; such is not case in Kurdistan and Iraq.) The fight between the political factions in Kurdistan and the violent disputes do not support the American schedule in the region but rather undermine that schedule. Destabilising Kurdistan and spreading insecurity is very disadvantageous to American policy in Iraq. Failure of American strategy in Iraq would intensify the critics of America’s intervention and would verify the allegations that though the Americans were able to topple Saddam they would fail to make peace and reconciliation among the Iraqis and the Kurds. Regionally such failure would intensify the severe critics from Middle Eastern countries – the Arab and Muslim world – regarding America’s intention to weaken them. Also both the American administration and its foreign policy would be pressurised back home by the American people because failure in stabilising Iraq and Kurdistan would weaken the reputation of American state more and more. American tries to prevent the escalation of conflict between the PUK and the PDK. In my opinion the PUK and the PDK have no other option but to live alongside each other, so the current non-fighting situation in Kurdistan is essential. If we assess the relations between the PUK and the PDK according to peace and reconciliation literature we can say that these two parties are not fighting now, they have not succeeded in making peace either, because there is a big different between peace and the absence of fighting. We can recognise the peace process when we see the roots of conflict eradicated, but the absence of violent does not automatically mean peace is maintained.
Another point I would like to make is that the fall of Saddam’s regime and the collapse of a tyrannical system were major factors in opening the way for Iraqis in general and Kurdish people in particular to adopt a new expectations. During the last two decades in the semi-independent Kurdish region it was difficult for the Kurdish people to think about an alternative to the PUK and PDK, as the shadow of Saddam’s regime like the sword of Damocles, was always present. The Kurdish people and political activists and intellectuals in Kurdistan were very frustrated with the terrible situation created by the PUK and PDK, but these were the lesser of two evils. So the PUK and PDK were widely accepted not because they were praiseworthy but because Saddam remained the biggest threat. In fact the aim for change in Kurdistan pre-dates the Change Movement, but its rise should be seen in context; PUK and PDK critics were searching for an opportunity to translate their rivalry into a political formula. The collapse the Ba’ath Party regime may be described as a golden outlet.
Internal factors behind the rise of the Change Movement
Attempts to Link the growth of the Change Movement with the issues of financial and political corruption, the poor performance of Kurdish representatives in the Iraqi parliament and government are unconvincing. Yes, Kurdish officials are corrupt, the ruling Kurdish parties have misused power in Kurdistan for reasons of self-interest- these parties have not concerned themselves with communal Kurdish interests in Baghdad- and so they deserve to be severely criticised. Yet, the mushrooming of the Change Movement should be understood in a broader sense. Theorising the Change Movement without reviewing the last five decades in Kurdish politics would give us a very anaemic interpretation of that new political phenomenon.
What exactly do I want to outline?
Since the formation of the PDK in 1946 as a Kurdish organisation which would represent Kurdish national identity, this party has constantly claimed to represent Kurdish society as a whole. However PDK agenda-setters and their followers have closed their eyes to a very simple fact; namely that no party can represent the whole of society particularly in our modern era. Societies consist of various social and political entities. Within societies we find different and sometimes opposite interests, societies are fields for conflict and confrontation between discourses and varieties of interests. The claim that any one political party is able to represent a whole society is theoretically not more than a myth and practically operates as an ideological fabrication. We have to give some credit to the PDK, for most nationalist groups use the same claim in an attempt to deploy the greater number of people. According to this point of view I can say that the PDK has never been able to represent the entire Kurdish society.
Since 1946 in parallel with the PDK Kurdish political arena has witnessed the rise and decline of many other political groups, which have influenced Kurdish politics too. The PDK has also experiences its own divisions and internal conflicts. In contrast to those try to sketch PDK as a homogenous entity, the PDK has never been free from internal tension.
What do the above mentioned conflicts and confrontations tell us? It could be argued that such confrontations and finally the birth of the PUK were a manifestation of the reality that the PDK was in no position to represent all, as indeed no party can. Accepting the PDK as the leading party in Kurdish politics has not been without controversy.
However we can pose the question as to whether the PUK was successful as a political organisation for those who did not want to be a part of the PDK’s machine. To answer this question we need to be cautious as this point should be addressed properly and adequately.
The beginning of the PUK was very problematic as it was built from three main factions, between which there were disagreements and tensions. They all agreed that they wanted to be something different from the PDK and this became the aim and ambition of Kurdish young activists for it was the main reason for their joining the PUK with great enthusiasm. But did the PUK manage to be different from the PDK?
During the 1980s neither party was in a position to be asked about how to manifest itself and address differences between each other in a civilised way. Each was engaged fighting the Iraqi regime, so it would had been very difficult to testify to their similarities and differences; unity against both a common enemy and occupiers was the dominant discourse (even though they did violate that principle on a regular basis).
The uprising in Kurdistan in 1991 and formation of a semi-independent state was considered by many people to be an exceptional opportunity for the PUK (to express their differences from the PDK). The PUK tried hard to maximise its numbers by applying the same methods as the PDK, though the question of ideological principles were not applicable any more. However, the PUK strengthened its muscles by claiming that they had a different agenda and were fundamentally different from the PDK, but the history of the PUK especially after 1991 was a story of failure. During the 1990s when both parties were engaged in savage fighting against each other the PDK claimed to be an original political entity deeply rooted in Kurdish society and accused the PUK of being a political heresy. At the same time the PUK maintained that they represented a new generation and that they had a modern and progressive agenda, whilst accusing the PDK of being backward party. I think at that time the PDK was fighting with its own shadow as gradually both of them developed more similarities than differences. It is important to mention here that during the fighting between 1994-1998 certain PUK agitators claimed that the fighting was rooted in the main between the PUK and the PDK. However as I explained earlier the PUK took the same route of PDK, so that now it is almost impossible to find small dissimilarities between these two parties.
For in reality they were technically two parties though their discourses, their methods of addressing issues, their dealings with a range of social and political issues were remarkably similar.
Again, where does the Change Movement stand?
It has to be stated that the desire for and aim to change in Kurdistan pre-dates the Change Movement itself, but this movement as a political formula has successfully managed to shape and organise much passion and eagerness for change. The Kurdistan election last June and also the very recent Iraqi election proved that the Change Movement is able and willing to canalise the mass’s passion for change. Canalising people’s anger in a peaceful way is a valuable task for a political organisation and nobody should undermine it under any circumstances, for this reason the Change Movement’s effort has to be valued.
Can the Change Movement initiate a new agenda and a new discourse in the Kurdish and Iraqi political map? We are not yet in a position to answer this question, as it is too early to make any judgments. What we can do now is be more patient and hopeful, and also support this new political phenomenon whilst allowing it more time, as the political behaviour of Change Movement is not only up to its agenda-setters but also up to the entire political atmosphere and the other political actors in Iraqi political stage.
The author is a Kurdish writer and a political activist
